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Abstract 
Probabilistic model-based diagnosis com­
putes the posterior probabilities of failure of 
components from the prior probabilities of 
component failure and observations of sys­
tem behavior. One problem with this method 
is that such priors are almost never directly 
available. One of the reasons is that the prior 
probability estimates include an implicit no­
tion of a time interval over which they are 
specified - for example, if the probability of 
failure of a component is 0.05, is this over the 
period of a day or is this over a week? A sec­
ond problem facing probabilistic model-based 
diagnosis is the modeling of persistence. Say 
we have an observation about a system at 
time it and then another observation at a 
later time t2. To compute posterior probabil­
ities that take into account both the observa­
tions, we need some model of how the state of 
the system changes from time t1 to t2. In this 
paper, we address these problems using tech­
niques from Reliability theory. We show how 
to compute the failure prior of a component 
from an empirical measure of its reliability 
- the Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF). 
We also develop a scheme to model persis­
tence when handling multiple time tagged ob­
servations. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Model-based diagnosis computes the set of possible 
explanations consistent with a physical system's ob­
served behavior [Hamscher et a/, 1 992]. A system con­
sists of a set of interconnected components. Each com­
ponent has a mode associated with it. The mode is a 
state variable which takes one of a fixed number of 
values. In the simplest case, the mode variable may 
take two states, ok and broken. The ok state de­
notes a mode where the component is working as it 
should while the broken state denotes a mode where 
the component is behaving abnormally. We have avail-
able some (partial) characterization of the the compo­
nents input-output behavior. That is, given the state 
of the mode variable of the component and an input 
value we have some information about what the out­
put might be. In the general case, this information 
amounts to specifying a set of possible values of the 
output for each mode-input combination. These com­
ponent characterizations and the interconnections of 
the components constitute the behavior model of the 
system. 
An observation consists of a set of variable-value pairs. 
Usually, the observation consists of the values of the 
input variables of the system and the values of some 
of the intermediate and output variables of the sys­
tem. A candidate is an assignment of a state to each 
of the system's mode variables. So for example, say 
a simple system has two components A and B, with 
corresponding mode variables MA and MB. Each 
of the mode variables can take two states, ok and 
broken. For this system, one possible candidate is 
(MA = ok, MB =broken). 
The process of diagnosis consists of computing the set 
of candidates which are consistent with the observa­
tion and model. One drawback of strictly logical ap­
proaches to diagnosis is that there is no notion of plau­
sibility. For non-trivial systems, the set of consistent 
candidates can be very large. A mechanism to order 
the candidates by likelihood is required. 
Probabilistic model-based diagnosis introduces a prior 
distribution over each component's mode variable. 
Each component's failure is assumed independent of 
the failure of other components. For example, the com­
ponent A might have the prior P(MA = ok) = 0.995 
and P(MA =broken) = 0.005. The diagnosis prob­
lem is now defined as computing a posterior proba­
bility distribution over the set of possible candidates. 
Let C be a state variable which ranges over all possi­
ble candidates and n be an observation. The diagnosis 
problem now amounts to computing P(CIO) [Geffner 
& Pearl, 1987; DeKleer & Williams, 1989; Poole, 1991; 
Srinivas, 1994]. 
One of the drawbacks of probabilistic diagnosis is that 
the specification of the prior probabilities of failures of 
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the components is difficult. The probabilities are not 
usually directly available from an expert. One of the 
reasons for this is that there is an implicit notion of 
time in the prior. For example, say a system has been 
running for a week at the time of diagnosis. Say we 
assess the prior probability of failure of a component 
A at the time we carry out our diagnosis and find that 
P(MA =broken)= p1. Now say the system has been 
running for a month and we assess P(MA =broken) 
again. Intuitively, the probability in the latter case 
should be different than p1. Furthermore, it should be 
larger - the longer the component has been on-line the 
higher the chances that it has failed. 
A related problem occurs when doing diagnosis with 
multiple observations, where each observation occurs 
at a different time. When performing diagnosis with 
multiple observations we need some model of the per­
sistence of the state of the system between the observa­
tions. For example. say we have an observation D[tl] 
at time t1 and an observation D[t2] at time t2. Let the 
candidate state variable at time t1 be C[t1] and that at 
time t2 be C[t2]. We will use c[t1] and c[t2] to denote 
states of C[tl] and C[t2]. The goal of diagnosis is to 
compute the distribution P(C(t2] I D[it], D[t2]). This 
distribution can be computed as: 
P(C[t2] = c[t2] I D[t1], D[t2]) oc 
P( C[t2] = c[t2], D[tl], D[t2]) 
oc P(D[t2] I C[t2] = c[t2], n[tl]) 
X P( C[t2] = C[t2] I D[tl]) 
P(D[t2] I C[t2] = c[t2]) 
xP(C[t2] = c[t2] I D[tl]) (1) 
The last step follows because knowing the state C[t2] 
of the system renders the observation n[t2] indepen­
dent of the history. The probability P(D[t2] I C[t2] = 
c[t2]) can be calculated from the system model. In 
the above equation we also need the distribution 
P(C[t2] I D[t1]), i.e., an estimate of the state at time 
t2 given the observation at time t1. This can be com­
puted as follows: 
P(C[t2] = c[t2] I D[td) = 
�e[t,]P( C[t2] = c[t2] I C[t1] = c[t1], D[t1]) 
x P( C[t1] = c[t1] I D[t1]) 
= �e[t,]P(C[h] = c[t2] I C[it] = c[tl]) 
x P( C[h] = c[h] I D[h]) (2) 
The last step follows from a Markov assumption that 
the system state C[t2] is rendered independent of all 
history upto time h when the state C[h] at time t1 is 
known. In the above equation, P( C[t1] I D[t1]) is the 
posterior over the state of the system at time t 1. This 
can be computed easily as: 
P(C[t1] = c[td I D[td) oc 
P(D[t1] I C[it] = c[tl]) x P(C[t1] = c[tl]) 
The first term in the RHS of the above equation can 
be computed from the system model. The second term 
is the prior probability of the candidate. This can be 
computed as a product from the prior distribution over 
the mode of the individual components. 
We see that the distribution P( C[t2] I C[tl]) in Equa­
tion 2 is still unspecified. This distribution quantifies 
the persistence of the state of the system. For exam­
ple, if the system never changed state spontaneously 
then we would have: 
( [ l [ l I [ l [ l { 1 if c[ft] = c[t2] P C t2 = c t2 C t1 = c t1 ) = 0 if c[tl] =F c[t2] 
However, a more practical situation would be one 
where components can fail on-line. If we had a model 
of how the components failed when they were on­
line, this could be used to compute the distribution 
P(C[t2] I C[t1]). 
In this paper we address the problems of specifying 
failure priors and modeling persistence using tech­
niques from reliability theory. Reliability theory gives 
us a model that relates the probability of component 
failure and the age of the component. We use this 
model to compute the prior probability of failure from 
the uptime of component and the Mean Time Between 
Failure (MTBF) . The MTBF is a summary measure of 
the reliability of a device and is often available with 
manufacturer specifications. We also use the compo­
nent failure model to compute the conditional distri­
bution over the state of a component at time t2 given 
the state at time t1. This conditional distribution is 
used to model persistence. 
2 RELIABILITY MODELS 
Reliability theory offers empirically validated models 
for the failure process of devices. The failure process of 
a device relates the probability of failure of the device 
to time (for example, see [Tsokos & Shimi, 1977]). We 
now describe one standard model of the failure process. 
Consider a device A. It has two states - ok and bro­
ken. It is initially in the ok state when it is brought 
on-line. At some point in time it transitions into the 
broken state. Once it is broken, it stays broken. It 
is assumed that the failure of A, i.e., the transition of 
A from the ok to broken state, occurs due to ran­
dom unmodeled events which occur with a probability 
that is constant over time. For example, an electronic 
component may fail due to surges in the power sup­
ply - these surges may occur randomly with a uniform 
probability. 
The modeling assumption is interpreted as follows: 
Given that the device has not failed at time t, the 
conditional probability that it will fail in the inter­
val [t, t + dt] is proportional to the length of the in­
terval. The probability is thus given by >.dt where >. 
is a proportionality constant. Say we model the fail­
ure of A with a continuous real variable X. That is, 
"X < t" denotes the event that A fails in the interval 
[0, tf Say F(t) is the cumulative distribution of X, 
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Figure 1: Different choices for the hazard function. 
i.e., F(t) = P(O :::; X :::; t). F(t) is the probability 
that A fails in the time interval [0, t]. 
From the modeling assumption, we have: 
P(t < X :::; t + dt I X > t) 
F(t + dt) - F(t) 
1- F(t) 
dF(t) 
dt 
F(t) 
>.dt 
>.dt 
>. (1- F(t))  
1 -.Xt -e 
(3) 
(Since F(O) = 0) 
We see that the probability of A failing before time t 
is small when t is small and converges to 1 as t tends 
to infinity. 
In general, instead of assuming a constant >. in the 
equation above, we might have a time varying condi­
tional density c(t), called the hazard function. This 
allows us to model various different degradation phe­
nomena in the device. For example, if we want to 
model a situation where a component has high prob­
ability of failure early in its life (called "wear in" ) we 
might choose c(t) to be high for small values oft. If we 
want to model wear out (and hence, increased chance 
of failure) of the device as it grows older we might 
choose c(t) to be high as t becomes large (See Fig 1). 
The differential equation Equation 3 can be solved for 
the appropriate choice of hazard function to give the 
corresponding density function. 
The expectation of the variable X is called the Mean 
Time between Failures. In the case of c(t) = >., the 
MTBF can be shown to be t. 
2.1 COMPUTING PRIOR 
PROBABILITIES OF FAILURE 
Using the above model, we can specify more precisely 
what we mean by the prior distribution over the mode 
of a component A. The probability that A is broken 
is a function of time. We will denote this probability 
at time t by P(MA [t] = broken). Say that the last 
time we knew that A was certainly not broken was tok. 
Usually, tok is the time that A first went on-line. 
We see that P(MA[t] = broken) is the probability 
that A failed in the interval [tok> t]. Say we assume a 
constant hazard function. We see that: 
P(MA =broken) P(tok <X :::; t I X > tok) 
F(t)- F(tok) 
1- F(tok) 
1- e->-(t-tok) (4) 
The above equation allows us to directly relate MTBFs 
to the prior probabilities that we need. 
Note that when we assume c(t) = >., P(MA = 
broken) is only a function of t - tok. That is, all 
we need to know is the length of the interval from the 
last time at which we were sure that A was not bro­
ken. However, if we assume more complicated hazard 
functions c(t), we would also need to know when A 
first went on-line. This is because we will measure t 
and tok using that as the start time. Hence in general, 
we will find that P(MA = broken) = f(t, tok) where 
f is some function whose form depends on the choice 
we make for the hazard function c(t). 
2.2 MODELING PERSISTENCE 
Consider the example outlined in Section 1. We saw 
there that some persistence model was necessary to 
compute P( C[t2] I C[h]). The reliability model de­
scribed above gives us a method to compute this dis­
tribution. 
Say the system has n components, C1, C2, ... , Cn. The 
mode variable corresponding to component C; is M;. 
We assume that the failure processes of the individual 
components are independent. Thus, given the state of 
C; at time h, we can compute a conditional probability 
distribution over the state at time t2 without regard to 
any of the other components. If we assume a constant 
hazard function >.; for C;, this distribution is given by 
Table 1. 
The state c[t] of the variable C[t] consists of a state 
assignment to each of the mode variables M;. De­
noting the state of M; [t] by m; [t] we have c[t] = 
(Ml[t] = ml[t],M2[t] = m2[t], ... ,Mn[t] = mn[t]}. 
From the independence assumption of the failure pro­
cesses we have: 
P( C[t2] = c[t2] I C[tl] = c[tt]) = 
P(Mt [t2] = m1 [t2], ... , Mn [t2] = mn [t2] I 
Mt[tt] = ml[t1], ... , Mn[tl] = mn[tt]) 
IT19:5nP(M;[t2] = m;[t2] I M;[tt] = m;[tl]) 
Each of P(M;[t2] = m;[t2] I M;[tt] = m;[tt]) can be 
computed as shown in Table 1. Thus, the failure pro­
cesses of the individual components and an assump­
tion about their independence gives us a model for 
the persistence of the system state. The distribution 
P( C[t2] I C[tl]) can be computed using t2, t1 and the 
MTBFs of the individual components M;. 
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Table 1: Persistence of M; from t1 to t2. 
M;[tl] =broken 
0 
M;[t2] =broken 
3 USING RELIABILITY MODELS 
IN DIAGNOSIS 
We illustrate the use of reliability models in model­
based diagnosis with some examples. We will first de­
scribe a system and a decision theoretic repair model 
for the system. We will then describe two different 
scenarios with this system. 
The first scenario demonstrates how diagnosis/repair 
depends crucially on when an observation is made. 
The observation in this case is a "nothing wrong" ob­
servation. That is, the observation does not indicate 
any discrepancy. We show that if this observation was 
made when the system was new then the probability 
of everything being ok is very large (as we would ex­
pect) and the optimal decision is to do nothing (again, 
as we would expect). However, if the same observa­
tion is made instead when the system is older, the 
posterior probability that everything is ok decreases 
substantially. In this case, the optimal decision is to 
actually replace two of the components. This decision 
can be seen as an example of preventive maintenance. 
The second scenario demonstrates the need for persis­
tence models in the presence of multiple observations 
and actions. We first make an observation at time t1. 
The corresponding best action is computed and exe­
cuted and is found to fix the anomaly exhibited by 
the system. Now, at a later time t2, the same anoma­
lous observation occurs. A persistence model for the 
component states is required to compute the posterior 
probabilities and the optimal decision after the second 
observation. Though the observation at time t2 and 
time t1 are the same, the posterior distribution and 
the optimal decision are very different. 
3.1 THE EXAMPLE SYSTEM 
Consider the digital circuit shown in Fig 2. A is an 
And gate, 0 is an Or gate and X is an Xor gate. Each 
of the gates can be ok or broken. When a gate is 
ok it works as it is supposed to. When it is broken 
we need a fault model. For the purposes of this ex­
ample we will assume that we have a fully specified 
fault model for each gate. Specifically, we will assume 
stuck-at-0 fault models for A and 0 and a stuck-at-1 
fault model for X. That is, when A (or 0) is in the 
broken state the output of the gate is 0 irrespective 
of the input. Similarly, when X is broken, its output 
is 1 irrespective of the input. Say the MTBF of the 
And gate A is 100 hours, that of the Or gate 0 is 250 
Figure 2: The example circuit. 
Table 2: Repair cost functions. 
LA\m,d Lo(m,d 
b fix T2 b fix $3 
b dont $-8 b dont $12 
ok fix $2 ok fix ll-3 
ok dont $0 ok dont $0 
Lx\m,dT 
b fix �4 
b dont $14 
ok fix $4 
ok dont $0 
hours and that of the Xor gate X is 350 hours. 
We also have a cost model that describes the repair 
costs of the system. We associate a repair decision 
with each component. The decision alternatives are 
fix and dont-fix. We describe the repair cost for each 
component with a cost function whose arguments are 
its mode state and the repair alternative. The cost 
functions for each of the gates is shown in Table 2. 
The system repair cost is assumed to be the sum of 
the repair costs of the components. That is, given 
a state for each mode variable of the system and a 
repair decision alternative for each component, we can 
sum the cost of the repair decision alternative for each 
component to get the repair cost function Ls for the 
entire system. The arguments to this cost function are 
a candidate (i.e., state assignment to each component 
of the system) and a composite decision. A composite 
decision consists of a choice of a repair alternative for 
each component in the system. 
The cost function L for each component is quite in­
tuitively assessed. Consider the case where the com­
ponent A is ok and the decision is dont-fix. We use 
this as the reference situation and assign it a cost of 
$0. Hence LA(ok,dont-fix) = $0. When we do decide 
to fix, say that we throw the old component away and 
replace it with a new one irrespective of what its ac­
tual state is. The cost of implementing the fix decision 
summarizes the temporary downtime cost required to 
bring the system down to change the component and 
the cost of the new component. Say we determine this 
cost to be $2. Hence LA(broken,fix) = LA(ok,fix) 
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Figure 3: Bayesian network for Scenario 1. 
= $2. Finally, we assign a cost to the case where the 
gate is broken but we choose dont-fix. This cost ba­
sically summarizes the cost of system downtime as a 
result of this non-operational component. Say we de­
termine the cost to be $10. Hence LA (broken,dont­
fix) = $10 . There is an implicit time horizon over 
which these costs are being measured- say it is 1 hour 
in this example. 
In our framework, diagnosis involves computing the 
posterior distribution over the candidate state variable 
given observations. We will later see how these calcu­
lations can be made by translating the system model 
into a Bayesian network. 
Repair involves choosing the optimal composite deci­
sion for the entire system given the posterior distribu­
tion over the candidates. The optimal decision dopt is 
the one which results in the least expected cost. That 
IS: 
dopt = mind(L.cP(C = c lfl)Ls (D = d, C = c)) 
In this equation, d ranges over all possible composite 
decisions and c ranges over all possible candidates. 
3.2 SCENARIO 1: EFFECT OF TIME ON 
DIAGNOSIS/REPAIR 
Consider the system of Fig 2. Say that it has been 
been up for 10 hours and the observation n = (lr = 1, 
I2 = 1, I3 = 0, h = 0) is recorded. Note that n 
seems to suggest that there is no problem with the 
system since the inputs generate the expected output. 
We assume that the time is counted from the time the 
system was new. We will further assume that when the 
system was new every component was certainly ok. 
The system model can be translated into a Bayesian 
network as shown in Fig 3 (see [Srinivas, 1994] for 
details). The node C has 8 states, one corresponding 
to each combination of states of MA, Mo and Mx. Let 
mA be a state of MA. We define mo and mx similarly. 
The conditional distribution of C given its parents is 
just a deterministic distribution which maps each state 
combination of its parents to the corresponding state 
Table 3: System up 10 hours, n observed. 
Failure priors 
Comp. Uptime MTBF P(M =bJ 
A 10 100 0.0952 
0 10 250 0.03 92 
X 10 3 50 0.0282 
Posterior P(CIO 
A 0 X 
ok ok ok 0.9957 
b b ok 0.0043 
ok ok b 0.0000 
ok b ok 0.0000 
ok b b 0.0000 
b ok ok 0.0000 
b ok b 0.0000 
b b b 0.0000 
Expected cost 
DA Do Dx $ 
dont dont dont 0.0855 
fix dont dont 2.0513 
dont fix dont 3 .03 42 
dont dont fix 4.0855 
fix fix dont 5.0000 
fix dont fix 6.0513 
dont fix fix 7.03 42 
fix fix fix 9.0000 
Table 4: System up 90 hours, n observed. 
Failure priors 
Comp. Uptime MTBF P(M =b) 
A 90 100 0.593 4 
0 90 250 0.3023 
X 90 3 50 0.2267 
Posterior PlClO 
A 0 X 
ok ok ok 0.6126 
b b ok 0.3874 
ok ok b 0.0000 
ok b ok 0.0000 
ok b b 0.0000 
b ok ok 0.0000 
b ok b 0.0000 
b b b 0.0000 
Expected cost 
DA Do Dx $ 
fix fix dont 5.0000 
dont fix dont 6.0995 
fix dont dont 6.6493 
dont dont dont 7.7488 
fix fix fix 9.0000 
dont fix fix 10.0995 
fix dont fix 10.6493 
dont dont fix 11.74;88 
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of C. That is, we have P(C = (mA, mo, mx) 
MA = mA, Mo = mo, Mx = mx) = 1. 
We now perform diagnosis using the observation !l 
and the time of observation (viz, 10 hours). The prior 
probability of failure for each component is calculated 
on the basis of it being up for 10 hours. The evidence 
n is declared in the network (shown as grayed nodes) 
and then network inference is performed. We then 
look up the posterior distribution of C and compute 
the expected costs of the decisions. These are shown 
in Table 3. The results confirm our intuitions, viz, the 
most probable diagnosis is that nothing is wrong. The 
optimal decision is to not fix anything. 
Consider now a situation where, instead of 10 hours, 
the system was running for 90 hours when observation 
n was made. In this case, the prior probability of fail­
ure of each component is computed on the basis of it 
being up for 90 hours. We then do the diagnosis and 
compute the expected value of decisions for this situ­
ation. The posterior distributions and expected deci­
sion costs are shown in Table 4. In this situation, the 
most probable diagnosis is again that everything is ok, 
the same as when n was observed after 10 hours. How­
ever, the most probable diagnosis is much less proba­
ble. The optimal decision in this situation however, is 
to replace the And gate and Or gate. This is an exam­
ple of preventive maintenance. The expected costs of 
replacing now is lower than deferring the replacement. 
This is because the probability of failure is rising to a 
critical value. 
3.3 SCENARIO 2: MODELING 
PERSISTENCE 
Say the system of Fig 2 has been been up for time 
t1 = 20 hours and the observation !l[ii] = (11 = 0, 
12 = 0, 1a = 0, Is = 1) is recorded. Note that !l[t1] 
indicates some problem with the system - if every­
thing was working correctly the output h would have 
value 0. Say we compute the posterior probabilities 
and the optimal decision. This computation is similar 
to that of the previous section. The posterior prob­
abilities and optimal decision are shown in Table 5. 
The optimal decision is to fix the XOR gate alone. 
Say we carry out this decision and then observe (im­
mediately) that the output 16 changes to 0. Thus, the 
observed discrepancy is fixed. Now say 20 hours more 
elapse and at time t2 = 40 hours, we observe !l[t2] = 
(11 = 0, 12 = 0, 1a = 0, 16 = 1) . Note that !l[tl] and 
!l[t2] have the same values for the input and output 
variables. 
The situation is represented by the dynamic Bayesian 
network of Fig 4. The section of the figure within the 
boundary marked t1 represents the situation at time 
t1. The variable M� [td represents the state of the 
XOR gate immediately after it is replaced. Note that 
immediately after replacement we know that the gate 
is in the ok state. This is represented in the Bayesian 
----------
--
----
--
-
� ( t_l = 20 hours \ 
( 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Figure 4: Bayesian network for Scenario 2. 
network as evidence (grayed node). The variable I�[tl] 
represents the output immediately after the replace­
ment action. As per our scenario, this variable is ob­
served to have value 0. 
The section of Fig 4 within the boundary marked t2 
represents the situation at time t2. The link between 
MA[t1] and MA[t2] represents the persistence of the 
state of the AND gate. We compute the distribution 
P(MA[t2]IMA[tl]) using Table 1. When using the ta­
ble, we set AA = MTkFA = 160 and t2 - t1 = 20. 
The conditional distributions P(Mo[t2]1Mo[ti]) and 
P(Mx[t2]1M�[tl]) and are computed similarly. The 
anomalous observation at time t2 is also entered as 
evidence in the Bayesian network (shown as grayed 
nodes). 
The node C[t2] has 8 states each of which corresponds 
to one joint state of MA [t2], Mx [t2] and Mo [t2]. The 
conditional distribution of C[t2] is quantified as de­
scribed in the previous section. The posterior distri­
bution over the states of the system at time t2 can be 
computed simply by doing inference in the Bayesian 
network and looking up the posterior distribution of 
C[t2]. The posterior distribution at time t2 and the 
corresponding decision costs are shown in Table 6. The 
optimal decision now is to replace both the X 0 R and 
Modeling failure priors and persistence in model-based diagnosis 513 
Table 5: Posteriors and costs at time t1 (before repair). 
Posterior P(CiO) 
A 0 X 
ok ok b 0.7558 
b ok b 0.1673 
ok b b 0.0629 
b b b 0.013 9 
b b ok 0.0000 
b ok ok 0.0000 
ok b ok 0.0000 
ok ok ok 0.0000 
Expected cost 
DA Do Dx $ 
dont dont fix 6.3728 
fix dont fix 6.9226 
dont fix fix 8.4502 
fix fix fix 9.0000 
dont dont dont 16.3 728 
fix dont dont 16.9226 
dont fix dont 18.4502 
fix fix dont 19.0000 
the AND gate. 
Superficially, the situation at time t1 and t2 seem to be 
quite similar, viz, that (a) the system has been working 
for 20 hours since "things were ok" (b) the observation 
(!1 = 0, !2 = 0, Ia = 0, h = 1) is made. However, the 
situations are actually quite different. At time t2 we 
have to account for the (a) the observations and ac­
tions at time h and (b) possible failures of components 
between time t1 and t2. 
The persistence model for the system allows us to in­
corporate this information when computing the pos­
terior distribution at time t2. Note that the Bayesian 
network inference is implicitly carrying out the com­
putation of P( C[t2] I C[t1]) (discussed in Section 1). 
4 DISCUSSION 
Modeling persistence in diagnosis has been of interest 
both in the model-based diagnosis community and in 
the Bayesian network community. Early work in the 
model-based diagnosis community has handled per­
sistence only to the extent of assuming that in the 
case of multiple observations the state of each com­
ponent stays the same across all observations. This 
corresponds, in our framework, to the situation where 
multiple observations are made very close in time. 
[Portinale, 1992] addresses the problem of temporal 
evolution of state in model-based diagnosis. The evolu­
tion is modeled as a discrete time Markov chain. The 
state transition matrix is assumed to come from re­
liability measures of components. A uniform initial 
prior on all possible world states is used. A defini­
tion of a temporal diagnosis is proposed that general­
izes the definition of a diagnosis in a static system. A 
Table 6: Posteriors and costs at time t2. 
Posterior P(CIO) 
A 0 X 
ok ok b 0.5712 
b ok b 0.2809 
ok b b 0.0991 
b b b 0.0487 
b b ok 0.0000 
b ok ok 0.0000 
ok b ok 0.0000 
ok ok ok 0.0000 
Expected cost 
DA Do Dx $ 
fix dont fix 7.7743 
dont dont fix 8.4117 
fix fix fix 9.0000 
dont fix fix 9.6374 
fix dont dont 17.7743 
dont dont dont 18.4117 
fix fix dont 19.0000 
dont fix dont 19.6374 
method of eliminating very unlikely diagnoses is pro­
posed. Our approach has a similar motivation - viz, 
to use models of component failure processes to model 
change of system state. However, our approach is sig­
nificantly more general. We show that the problem 
of specification of priors can be addressed within the 
same framework. The priors are computed directly 
from the time at which diagnosis takes place and the 
MTBFs of the components. Our approach also allows 
modeling of effects of repair actions (as in the example 
of Section 3.3). Time is considered to be continuous. 
Finally, rather than eliminating unlikely diagnoses, we 
compute posterior probabilities over candidates. This 
is necessary if a decision theoretic scheme for choosing 
actions is to be used. 
The model of persistence developed in this paper is 
closely related to work in modeling persistence in 
Bayesian networks. [Dean & Kanazawa, 1989] propose 
a modeling framework for persistence and change using 
temporal probabilistic networks. A Markov assump­
tion is employed. The temporal probabilistic network 
is quantified by specifying the conditional probabil­
ity of each proposition in the network given the state 
of the same proposition at the immediately preceding 
time point and the states of the causes of the propo­
sition at the previous time point. An exponentially 
decaying survivor function is proposed to model the 
probability of a proposition being true if it was true at 
the previous time and none of the causes that make it 
untrue are active. The survivor function accounts for 
unmodeled causes that might change the state of the 
proposition. 
The model presented in this paper can be viewed as 
a specific instantiation of the general framework sug­
gested by Dean and Kanazawa. We assume that the 
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only system state that persists across time is the mode 
of the variables and that the failure processes of the 
components are independent. This allows us to model 
persistence of system state by simply modeling the per­
sistence of each component individually. The persis­
tence model for each component falls directly out of 
the physical process of failure postulated by the relia­
bility model. This persistence model is an exponential 
decay function. 
The modeling of action (and hence of persistence) 
in causal probabilistic networks has been a field of 
active interest [Balke & Pearl, 1994; Darwiche & 
Goldzmidt, 1994; Heckerman & Shachter, 1994; Pearl, 
1994]. When reasoning about actions which occur 
over separated points in time, one also has to ac­
count for possible changes in system state occurring 
due to unmodeled events. This paper advances a spe­
cific method for doing so in the domain of diagnosis of 
physical systems. 
Our method for modeling persistence has been devel­
oped assuming that the behavior of each component 
is deterministic, both when it is in the ok state and 
and when it is in the broken state. This allows us 
to consider only the mode variables of the components 
as the persisting state of the system. This is because 
the joint state of the mode variables completely de­
termines the behavior of the system. In the situation 
where components are not deterministic1, as a first ap­
proximation, one might use the same modeling scheme 
as the one presented in this paper. This would mean, 
in effect, that we assume that each component "resam­
ples" to compute its output in each observation. Thus, 
the same component with the same input could possi­
bly have two different outputs in two observations (if 
the component were in the broken state). If this ap­
proximation is inaccurate, modeling extensions along 
the lines suggested by Darwiche and Goldszmidt can 
be incorporated. 
The simplistic decision theoretic repair model set up 
in this paper is for illustration purposes only. More 
sophisticated and realistic repair schemes (see [Hecker­
man et a/, 1995], [Srinivas, 1995]) have been suggested 
in the literature. These can be used in concert with 
the persistence model developed in this paper. 
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